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The IEEE 802.16 Working Group on Broadband Wireless Access Standards released IEEE 802.16-2004 which is a standardized
technology for supporting broadband and wireless communication with fixed and nomadic access. After the IEEE 802.16-2004
standard, a new advanced and revised standard was released as the IEEE 802.16e-2005 amendment which is foundation of Mobile
WiMAX network supporting handover and roaming capabilities. In the area of security aspects, compared to IEEE 802.16-2004,
IEEE 802.16e, called Mobile WiMAX, adopts improved security architecture—PKMv2 which includes EAP authentication, AES-
based authenticated encryption, and CMAC or HMAC message protection. However, there is no guarantee that PKMv2-based
Mobile WiMAX network will not have security flaws. In this paper, we investigate the current Mobile WiMAX security architecture
focusing mainly on pointing out new security vulnerabilities such as a disclosure of security context in network entry, a lack of
secure communication in network domain, and a necessity of eﬃcient handover supporting mutual authentication. Based on
the investigation results, we propose a novel Mobile WiMAX security architecture, called RObust and Secure MobilE WiMAX
(ROSMEX), to prevent the new security vulnerabilities.
1. Introduction
More and more, our life is closely related to a variety of
networking environments for using Internet-based services
and applications. The ever-changing trends of our lifestyle
require faster speed, lower cost, more broadband capacity,
as well as nomadic and mobility support. Due to these
reasons and demands, IEEE 802.16 working group has
created new standards with mobility access called the IEEE
802.16e-2005 amendment. It has also been developed by
many working groups of the Worldwide Interoperability
for Microwave Access (WiMAX) Forum, similar to Wi-
Fi in IEEE 802.11 standards. The WiMAX Forum tries
to coordinate the interoperability and compatibility of
various company products as a field standard. Specifically,
Mobile WiMAX technology is considered as one of the
best next-generation wireless technologies because it can
support high-speed, broadband data transmission, fully-
supported mobility, and wide coverage and high capacity
[1–4].
From a security viewpoint, the Mobile WiMAX system
based on the IEEE 802.16e-2005 amendment has more
enhanced security features than the existing IEEE 802.16-
based WiMAX network system. The improved core part of
the security architecture in Mobile WiMAX, called PKM
v2, is operated as a security sublayer in a MAC layer
like PKMv1 in IEEE 802.16-2004. The PKMv2 provides a
message authentication scheme using HMAC or CMAC,
device/user authentication using EAP methods, and con-
fidentiality using AES-CCM encryption algorithm [5, 6].
Even though Mobile WiMAX uses more enhanced security
schemes supported by PKMv2, it can not guarantee the
reliability of the whole Mobile WiMAX systems and network
architectures. In addition, open architecture and various
applications of Mobile WiMAX could cause much more
risks to try to compromise Mobile WiMAX network than
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existing systems. In Mobile WiMAX, the network domain
consists of a link domain between Subscriber Station (SS)
and the Base Station (BS), access network domain, and
mobility domain. Each network domain has a possibility of
potential risks. In case of a link domain, the Mobile WiMAX
does not support any security features to authenticate peers
and encrypt initial entry control and user data. In access
network domain of Mobile WiMAX, it only provides a
regular guideline for protecting inter-network data based on
IP security, even it is not a scope of IEEE 802.16e. In addition,
a handover which is one of the most distinguished features in
Mobile WiMAX is left alone without security functionalities.
Specifically, the problem is very critical when the handover
is supporting fast handover optimization option. Therefore
this paper focuses on three kinds of security vulnerabilities
and their countermeasure according to each Mobile WiMAX
network domain. Finally, we present security architecture of
Mobile WiMAX network as called Robust and Secure MobilE
WiMAX (ROSMEX).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we study an overview of Mobile WiMAX security and analyze
known security vulnerabilities and attacks. In Section 3, new
security threats and the related works in Mobile WiMAX
network are examined. In Section 4, we propose possible
solutions in order to cope with the new threats we mention
in Section 3. In Section 5, the comparison and analysis
of the proposed approaches with the current approaches
are presented. In Section 6, we discussed a reliable Mobile
WiMAX architecture including our proposed solutions. In
the last section, we conclude with a summary and discussion
of future work.
2. Background
The first stage of IEEE 802.16 standard was released in 2004;
many researchers have tried to analyze the new standard’s
vulnerabilities and deal with possible attacks. In this section,
we describe an overview of security features in Mobile
WiMAX. Moreover, this paper analyzes the known existing
security vulnerabilities and attacks [7–10].
2.1. Overview of Mobile WiMAX Security. IEEE 802.16e-2005
amendment-based Mobile WiMAX supports many good
security features as compared to the fixed IEEE 802.16-
based WiMAX security schemes. Basically, the Privacy Key
Management sublayer in the MAC layer of IEEE 802.16-
2005 is a core part which comprises the WiMAX security.
The PKM sublayer provides not only key related manage-
ment functions but also strong protection for encrypting
traﬃc and EAP-based flexible authentication for accessing
valid users and devices. In the Mobile WiMAX system,
more enhanced PKMv2 is supported, together with vari-
ous cryptographic suites. In the research of [3, 4] from
WiMAX Forum, the security features of the PKMv2-based
Mobile WiMAX consist of Key Management Protocol, Device
and User Authentication, Traﬃc Encryption/Decryption,
Control Message Authentication, Hard Handover, and IP
Mobility Support. PKMv2-based key management protocol
manages and maintains various keys for EAP authentica-
tion, message authentication, traﬃc encryption, handover
(Authentication Key transfer), and multicast/broadcast secu-
rity.
2.2. KnownVulnerabilities and Attacks. The security architec-
ture of Mobile WiMAX is partially originated from wireless
networks based on IEEE 802.11. In the case of IEEE 802.11-
based wireless networks, a great deal of security-related
research has already been studied, and a few vulnerabilities
have been known as those in [7, 8]. Among many interesting
researches, John Bellardo and Stefan Savage’s research [7]
showed a possibility of Denial of Service attacks using
identity vulnerability and Media Access Control vulnerability
in MAC layer of IEEE 802.11 at the USENIX conference. In
this section, we investigate well-known vulnerabilities based
on the IEEE 802.16 network architecture from the existing
researches [9, 10].
In the case of an attack using Auth Invalid vulnerability,
Auth Invalid event is internally generated by the SS when
there is a failure authenticating a Key Reply or Key Reject
message, or externally generated by the receipt of an Auth
Invalid message sent from BS to SS. If SS sends Key Request
message with unauthenticated MAC code, BS responds to
Key Request with Auth Invalid. Thus, when SS receives
the Auth Invalid message, SS will transit from Authorized
state to Reauth Wait state, and SS will wait there until SS
gets something new from BS. If the Reauth Wait time is
expired before SS receives something from BS, SS sends
a Reauth Request in order to get into the network again.
Also while SS is in Reauth state, SS may receive an Auth
Reject message. This is a “Permanent Authorization Failure.”
When SS receives such a message he is pushed into silent
state, ceases all subscriber traﬃc, and will be ready to
respond to any management message sent by BS. This way
the attacker is able to manipulate the Authorization State
Machine. Moreover, the Auth Invalid message is not safe
and is easy to modify because HMAC- or CMAC- based
message authentication is not provided and PKM identifier
is not included. Auth Invalid contains only the error code
identifying the reason and the display string describing the
failure condition. Even better for attackers, this message’s
error code provides stateless Auth Invalid with unsolicited
property.
Finally, in a security vulnerability known as a Rogue BS
attack, SS can be compromised by a forged BS. At this time,
SS maybe believe he is connected to the real BS. Thus, the
forged BS can intercept SS’s whole information. In other
words, the rogue BS attack is a kind of Man-In-The-Middle
attack which is one of the well-known attacks in wireless
networks. In IEEE 802.16 using PKMv1, Auth Request
message includes only the contents for SS authentication
itself without correspondent BS’s authentication. When SS
tries to establish a connection to BS, there is no way to
confirm whether the BS is authorized or not. The authoriza-
tion process based on RSA authentication protocol allows
only BS to authenticate SS in PKMv1. Thus, it is possible
to masquerade as a Rogue BS after sniﬃng Auth-related
message from SS. However, in the case of Mobile WiMAX
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using PKMv2, it is diﬃcult to use the Rogue BS vulnerability
because mutual authentication function between SS and BS
is mandatory during authorization process. In authorization
state, the mutual authentication has two modes. In one
mode, RSA-based mutual authentication is used for only
mutual authentication. In the other mode, mutual authenti-
cation is followed by EAP authentication during initial entry
process.
2.3. Related Works. Recently there are a lot of Mobile
WiMAX researches and related to its security. In [11],
the authors focused on the EAP-based security approach
when a Mobile WiMAX user wants to get a handover
service. The possible solutions for secure handover in IEEE
802.16e networks are proposed, and the handover protocol
guarantees a backward/forward secrecy while giving little
burden over the previous researched handover protocols.
However, the proposed approaches are not considered the
overhead of EAP authentication procedure according to
frequent handover. If the frequent handover is occurred,
the preauthentication mechanism-based PKMv2 is closely
coupled to system performance. In [12–14], the research
reviewed the study of WiMAX and converged network
and security considerations for both the technologies. They
presented many security issues and vulnerability in Mobile
WiMAX and then proposed possible solutions. In addition,
the papers discuss all the security issues in both point-to-
multipoint and mesh networks and their solutions. Some
performance-related researches are studied. In [15], the
authors analyzed the performance eﬀect when RSA and
ECC algorithms are used in WiMAX. However, the research
is only evaluating the result, not proposing new approach
using ECC-based cryptographic approach. Moreover, the
initial network procedure in Mobile WiMAX is not eﬀectively
secured that makes man-in-the-middle attack possible. In
[16], Diﬃe-Hellman (DB) key exchange protocol enhance
the security level during network initialization. The modified
DH key exchange protocol is fit into mobile WiMAX network
to eliminate existing weakness in original DH key exchange
protocol. But, it can cause additional overhead to distribute
initial DH random number, and it can not present the
concrete modified DH scheme.
3. New Security Threat
3.1. Initial Network Entry Vulnerabilities. According to IEEE
802.16e-2005 standard, the Mobile WiMAX network per-
forms initial Ranging process, SS Basic Capability (SBC)
negotiation process, PKM authentication process, and reg-
istration process during initial network entry as illustrated in
Figure 1. Initial network entry is one of the most significant
processes in Mobile WiMAX network because the initial
network entry process is the first gate to establish a connec-
tion to Mobile WiMAX. Thus, many physical parameters,
performance factors, and security contexts between SS and
BS are determined during the process. However, specifically,
the SBC negotiation parameters and PKM security contexts
do not have any security measures to keep their confiden-
tiality. So, the possibility of exposure to malicious users or
outer network always exists in initial network entry process.
Even though Mobile WiMAX has a message authentication
scheme using HMAC/CMAC codes and traﬃc encryption
scheme using AES-CCM based on PKMv2, the security
schemes are only applied to normal data traﬃc after initial
network entry process not to control messages during initial
network entry. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare a solution
to protect important messages such as security negotiation
parameters in SBC messages and security contexts in PKM
messages during initial network entry.
3.2. Access Network Vulnerabilities. The WiMAX Forum
defined Network Reference Model (NRM) which can accom-
modate the requirements of WiMAX End-to-End Network
Systems Architecture [4] for Mobile WiMAX network. The
NRM is a logical representation of Mobile WiMAX architec-
ture consisting of the following entities: SS, Access Service
Network (ASN), and Connectivity Service Network (CSN).
SS means one of the mobile devices that would like to join
Mobile WiMAX network. ASN is a complete set of network
functions needed to provide radio access to Mobile WiMAX
subscribers. ASN consists of at least one BS and one ASN
Gateway (ASN/GW). Also, CSN is a set of network functions
that provide IP connectivity services to the WiMAX sub-
scribers. CSN consists of AAA Proxy/Server, Policy, Billing,
and Roaming Entities. Basically, Mobile WiMAX architecture
originated from the IEEE 802.16 standards. At the view
point of NRM, IEEE 802.16 standards only define a set of
functions between SS and BS. It means that the security
architecture given by IEEE 802.16 standards does not cover
intra-ASN and ASN-to-CSN. In Figure 2, we are able to
distinguish a secure domain covered by IEEE 802.16 standard
and insecure domains required additional security services.
In the case of communication range between SS and BS,
the exchange of messages during network entry process (by
the end of registration process) is belonging to insecure
domain A. The security threat of insecure domain A is
already mentioned in Section 3.1, and a possible solution
will be described in Section 4. On the other hand, the
communication range after network entry (at the beginning
of normal data traﬃc) belongs to the secure domain because
it can be protected by TEK encryption scheme and message
authentication function using HMAC/CMAC. Thus, there
remain two insecure domains: insecure domain B between
BS and ASN/GW and insecure domain C between ASN and
CSN. The reason we called the areas insecure domains is
because Network Working Group in WiMAX Forum just
assumes that the insecure domain B as illustrated in Figure 2
is a trusted network without suggesting any security function
[4]. Moreover, in the case of insecure domain C, the research
of [4] only mention a possibility of applying an IPSec tunnel
between ASN and AAA (in CSN) [4]. Therefore, in order to
make a more robust Mobile WiMAX network, more concrete
and eﬃcient countermeasures are needed.
3.3. Handover Vulnerabilities. Mobile WiMAX supports a
variety of handover methods for mobile access. There are
three handover methods supported within the IEEE 802.16e-
2005 amendment: Hard Handover (HHO), Fast Base Station
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Figure 1: Overview of initial network entry procedure.
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Figure 2: Overview of access network security.
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Switching, and Macro Diversity Handover. Of these, the
HHO is the only mandatory one in Mobile WiMAX.
Especially, HO process optimization flags are supported for
providing seamless mobility service. The HO optimization
flag consists of eight kinds of optimization options and
are used as an aim to shorten a network re-entry process
when occurring handover. Among the HO optimization
flags, PKM authentication phase (HO optimization flag #1)
and PKM TEK creation phase (HO optimization flag #2) are
related to Mobile WiMAX security as illustrated in Figure 3.
If these two flags are used, PKM authentication phase and
TEK creation phase do not occur during the re-entry process
in handover. Therefore, even though HO optimization flag
#1 and #2 are necessary to fast handover to decrease HO
latency for real-time services, these flags can give a chance
to cause critical security holes to malicious users like a
lack of valid entity authentication and man-in-the-middle
attack. Supporting security-related HO optimization, flags
are tradeoﬀ between handover performance and secure
communication. Thus, a possible alternative is required
which can cope with the security vulnerability and does not
interrupt seamless mobility service during handover.
4. Proposed Countermeasures
4.1. Approach to Initial Network Entry Vulnerabilities.
Although much significant information is exchanged during
initial network entry, there are not appropriate methods to
protect critical information in the entry process. In order
to eliminate the security vulnerability during initial network
entry, this paper applies Diﬃe-Hellman (DH) key agreement
scheme [17] to initial ranging procedure. Basically, DH key
agreement is to share an encryption key with global variables
known as prime numbers “p” and “g” a primitive root of
p. However, the original DH scheme has a threat of Man-
in-the-Middle attack. Thus, in this paper, we suggest a kind
of modified DH scheme using hash authentication. In a
ranging process, one of the ranging codes is used as a prime
number seed, and then hash authentication is applied to
the exchanging process for protecting Man-in-the-Middle
attack.
In Figure 4, initial ranging procedure is started when SS
receives UL-MAP message including ranging codes. Among
the received ranging codes, SS selects one of the ranging
codes (RCi) in SS’s step 1. If RCi consists of A1 and A2,
SS sends only a part of RCi (A1 or A2) and Hash value of
RCi to BS in order to protect Man-in-the-Middle attack. In
BS’s step 1, BS receives a part of RCi(A1) and the hashed
value H(RCi). BS finds A2 from ranging code pool using A1,
and then BS authenticates SS through verifying the received
hash value. Thus, the selected ranging code is not only
Mobile WiMAX communication but also used for generating
a prime number “p” as one of global variables in DH process.
In SS’s step 2, 3, and 4, SS generates the other global variable
“g” and public/private key pair and then sends them to BS.
BS receives a public key of SS and global variables (prime
number and its primitive root). If the received key and
variables are verified, BS also sends his public key to SS in BS’s
step 3. Thus, BS and SS can share DH global variables and
public key with each other through initial ranging process.
Of these, they can generate a shared common key called
“pre-TEK” separately and establish secret communication
channels in step 4 and 5 separately. Therefore, the proposed
approach can protect SBC security parameters and PKM
security contexts using the shared traﬃc encryption key (pre-
TEK) during initial network entry procedure.
4.2. Approach to Access Network Vulnerabilities. As we already
mentioned, PKM which is the main security architecture in
Mobile WiMAX only covers wireless traﬃc between SS and
BS because other communication ranges required security
functions that are beyond IEEE 802.16e-2005 standard.
Moreover, technical documents of Network Working Group
(NWG) in WiMAX Forum assume that ASN network is
trusted and AAA connections between ASN and CSN may
be protected with IPSec tunnel. However, there are a lot of
possibilities new security holes to happen including various
zero-day attacks. Moreover, IPSec requires additional s/w
and h/w facilities for supporting whole Mobile WiMAX
domains. Thus in this paper, we present a simple and eﬃcient
key exchange method using a device-certificate. Basically,
network devices in Mobile WiMAX have a device certificate,
so they can be applied to make more robust access to
network domain based on PKI structure. In order to applying
device certificate based approach to access network domain,
we assume that Mobile WiMAX devices are certified from
public authority and they can verify certificates of each other
using certificate chain. In Figure 5, all devices in Mobile
WiMAX have their own certificate and a certificate chain
for verification. If BS would like to exchange important
messages with ASN/GW, BS needs to generate a session
encryption key for secure communication between BS and
ASN/GW. In this case, BS first searches for an appropriate
certificate (including correspondent’s public key) to verify
ASN/GW’s identity and obtain public key. After getting
public key, BS generates “asn-TEK” as a session encryption
key for secure communication with ASN/GW. Using the
“asn-TEK,” BS encrypts a message and sends the encrypted
message together with the encrypted “asn-TEK” key using
ASN/GW’s public key, Timestamp, and Authority’s certificate
to ASN/GW. When ASN/GW receives the messages from
BS, ASN/GW first tries to verify the authority’s certificate
and checks the validation time from Timestamp. If the
verification process is successful, ASN/GW decrypts the “asn-
TEK” key and the original message. Thus, a problem of
insecure communication between BS and ASN/GW can be
solved by using “asn-TEK” key as a encryption key between
BS and ASN/GW. In the case of ASN-to-CSN, the proposed
method generates a common encryption key called “asn-csn-
TEK” using the same method as a way for BS-to-ASN/GW
to establish secure connection. In Figure 5, we can show an
example using “asn-csn-TEK”.
4.3. Approach to Handover Vulnerabilities. In Mobile
WiMAX, a handover process adopts a kind of fast handover
method based on Handover (HO) process optimization flags
to provide seamless communication by reducing the number
of message exchange. However, such a handover process still
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Figure 3: Overview of handover procedure.
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Figure 5: Proposed access network approach.
has a problem as we already mentioned in Section 3.3—
handover vulnerability. In this section, new handover
approach with embedded mutual authentication parameters
is proposed. The proposed HO approach includes a few
additional fields for the embedded parameters of providing
mutual authentication such as Nonce, Certificate (Cert),
Authorization Key (AK), and Acknowledge (Ack). First, the
challenge-response scheme with Nonce, Cert, and AK is
used to provide Target BS (TBS) authentication. Moreover,
HMAC/CMAC tuple is used for SS authentication as well as
message authentication. Thus, the proposed approach can
take an eﬀect on mutual authentication using the embedded
parameters even though HO optimization process is used.
From message 1 to message 3 in Figure 6, TBS authenti-
cation is first processed during HO-Request process. When
HO process is started, Serving BS (SBS) sends HO-Request
message with Nonce to TBS. TBS replies HO-Response with
an encrypted Nonce and Cert to SBS. If SBS verifies the
included Nonce and Cert in HO-Response message, SBS
sends HO-confirm message with Ack to TBS, and then TBS
authentication is finished. In the case of MS authentication,
CMAC/HMAC tuples are applied to authenticate MS as
illustrated message 4 and 5 in Figure 6. After HO process, MS
tries the Ranging process and TBS can authenticate MS using
MAC code verification because RNG-REQ message includes
CMAC/HMAC tuple generated by AK.
Therefore, our proposed method takes an eﬀect on
getting confidentiality by including a few information fields
in the existing HO message in spite of using additional
HO optimization flags. This approach enhances security
and performance factors during handover without full
authentication process based on PKMv2.
5. Comparison of the Proposed Approaches
5.1. Mobile WiMAX-Based DH Approach in Initial Entry
Procedure. In order to protect a vulnerability of initial
network entry, modified DH approach was proposed in this
paper. The proposed approach provides both confidentiality
and countermeasure against Man-in-the-Middle attack in
comparison with IEEE 802.16e and original DH scheme.
Moreover, there are not communications overhead because
the parameters of the proposed approach are embedded in
the existing initial ranging message exchange. However, the
modified DH approach performs a couple of cryptographic
operations. Even though the processing delay is very small
and the original DH-based scheme is one of the best
known schemes for communication system security, more
optimized cryptographic operations for Mobile WiMAX
entry process are considered in the near future. Table 1
shows that the proposed approach provides confidential-
ity and countermeasure against man-in-the-middle-attack.
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Figure 6: Proposed handover security approach.
Moreover, in the side of performance consideration, it does
not have any communication overhead, but a little bit
security overhead. In [16], the authors proposed a similar
approach to apply the enhanced DH scheme to Mobile
WiMAX network initialization process. Basically the DH
approach including ours is better than the existing approach.
However, the Rahman’s approach is not clear to understand
and they can not provide how the random is generated and
distributed to others to use DH scheme.
5.2. Mobile WiMAX’s Device Certificate-Based Key Exchange
in Access Network. In Mobile WiMAX network domain,
IPsec has been recommended as one of solutions to provide
network security. However, every device in Mobile WiMAX
has to be installed and support IPSec functionality in order
to use IPSec-based security services. Thus, the proposed
approach concentrated on simple and eﬃcient key exchange
without any additional features. In Table 2, we can see
that IPSec needs two-phase negotiation procedure (6∼ 9
times message exchange) and a little bit complex security
operation such as security association, key exchange, and
key generation. On the other hand, the proposed approach
provides very intuitive and systematic solution (2 times
message exchange) using a device certificate. Although the
proposed approach uses certificate-related functions such as
signing and verifying, it does not have any side-eﬀect in
Mobile WiMAX network because the overhead and delay of
certificate-based operations are already verified in the RSA-
based authentication scheme in IEEE 802.16e standard. The
RSA-based certificate approach is similar to the proposed
approach but it requires much processing delay than our
ECC-based certificate approach. In case of RSA approach, the
processing delay is about 120 ms. On the other hand, in ECC
case it is only under 100 ms.
5.3. Mutual Authentication Approach in Handover Procedure.
Fast mobility support is one of the most distinguished
capabilities in Mobile WiMAX. However, it can not support
an authentication function during handover because of using
HO optimization. The proposed approach used embedded
parameters for mutual authentication during handover
process. Thus, at the view of security aspect, the proposed
approach can provide mutual authentication in comparison
with the default IEEE 802.16e handover scheme. Moreover,
in performance analysis, it shows low processing overhead
(1 time encryption/decryption for verifying Nonce) and
no communication delay because it does not cause any
additional authentication-related message exchange. In case
of Hur’s [11] approach, it is based on EAP-based pre-
authentication. However, it can not be a stable solution
under frequent handover environment. In Mobile WiMAX,
the dynamic mobility is one of the best advantages.
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Table 1: Security and performance analysis in network entry security.
IEEE 802.16e Applying original DH Rahman’s approach [16] Proposed approach
Security
Confidentiality None O O O
Man-in-the-middle
attack





Random number and key
generation
Random number and





Not clear to generate and
distribute DH values
None
Table 2: Security and performance analysis in access network.
IEEE 802.16e Applying IPSec
Certificate approach
with RSA 1024 bit
Proposed approach with
ECC 163 bit




















2 phase 6∼ 9 times
packet exchange
1 phase 2 times packet
exchange




— O None None
Table 3: Security and performance analysis in handover security.
IEEE 802.16e
Handover














High (depends on the number of
handover)
None
6. Discussion of Secure and Robust Mobile
WiMAX with Proposed Approach
This paper proposed novel approaches to minimize secu-
rity risks in Mobile WiMAX network. We showed a reli-
able Mobile WiMAX architecture applying the security
approaches called RObust Secure MobilE WiMAX (ROS-
MEX) as illustrated in Figure 7. In ROSMEX, the enhanced
network entry process has an initial ranging process with
modified DH key agreement. The approach assigns a tem-
porary Security Association (e.g., pre-TEK and predefined
cryptographic suites) to prevent a primary management
connections between SS and BS. Thus, ROSMEX can give
confidential communications to whole wireless commu-
nication range because the proposed approach generates
temporary traﬃc encryption key and then uses the key
for traﬃc encryption before SBC negotiation. Moreover,
ROSMEX supports secure communications in all access
networks. Any two entities in Mobile WiMAX can establish
a secure channel using device certificate-based simple and
eﬃcient key exchange. The approach eliminates all possibil-
ities of disguising as a valid entity in Mobile WiMAX. In
Section 5.2, we already knew that it is a more eﬃcient method
than IPSec approach.. Finally, ROSMEX can support secure
mobility despite omitting authentication and TEK phases
by using HO optimization flags. The improved HO process
has embedded mutual authentication parameters in order
to provide authentication during handover. The challenge-
response scheme embedded in HO messages authenticates
TBS, and SS is authenticated by MAC scheme. Specifically,
our proposed approaches do not need any additional
message passing and do not prevent original control flow
10 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
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Figure 7: Robust and secure mobile WiMAX network.
of Mobile WiMAX. Therefore, ROSMEX architecture with
enhanced security countermeasures can satisfy not only the
security requirements but also performance requirements
during Initial Network Entry, Access Network Communica-
tion, and Handover process.
7. Conclusion
Mobile WiMAX is one of the best candidate systems
to accommodate demands for broadband wireless access.
It can support worldwide roaming capabilities, superior
performance, low latency, supporting all-IP core network,
advanced QoS, and security. Moreover, Mobile WiMAX can
cooperate with existing and emerging networks. However,
Mobile WiMAX technology is not perfect and is not an
ultimate solution for beyond 3G networks, but a kind of
bridging system toward 4G networks. In the case of security
aspects in Mobile WiMAX, it still has a potential possibility
of a few security-related vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we investigated new security vulnerabilities
such as a disclosure of secret contexts during initial entry
procedure, a lack of a protection mechanism in access
network communication, and a possibility of rogue SS or
BS attacks during HO process (in case of using HO opti-
mization flags). Therefore, in order to eliminate the security
vulnerabilities, we proposed three possible countermeasures.
In the case of an initial entry process threat, modified
DH key agreement is applied to initial ranging process
to generate session encryption key. Using the temporal
encryption key, the messages including security contexts
can be protected during initial entry procedure. Secondly,
a simple key exchange scheme based on device certificate
was proposed as a solution to settle the vulnerability of
the access network. Thus, each network component in ASN
and CSN can generate session encryption keys and the
correspondents also can verify them. Finally, the handover
threat could be reduced using the modified HO procedure
approach including a challenge-response scheme and MAC
code verification in the existing HO messages.
Based on the proposed approaches, we analyzed and
compared our approach called ROSMEX architecture with
the existing solutions. We believe that our ROSMEX archi-
tecture will contribute to make an enhanced Mobile WiMAX
network. In future work, more research for IMT-advanced
architecture is needed.
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